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WHY FORMAT, NOT CONTENT,
IS THE KEY TO IDENTIFYING
COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Bruce E. H. Johnson and Jeffrey L. Fishert
It is an odd lawsuit whose linchpin is that a company has de-
ceived the public by making misleading statements through the
media regarding its business operations, but that simultaneously
acknowledges that "[t]he media have continued to expose [the
company's] actual practices."' It is odder still when the lawsuit's
complaint is grounded in consumer protection law, but the plaintiff
freely admits that he was not harmed or deceived by the defendant
company. Yet these were the paradoxical assertions that Marc
Kasky leveled against Nike in late 1999, in a case that pressed the
limits of consumer protection jurisprudence and eventually ex-
posed the woefully underdeveloped foundations of the First
Amendment's commercial speech doctrine.
Consumer protection laws in general-and false advertising
laws in particular-allow the government to punish deceptive
"commercial speech," regardless of whether the speaker was or
2should have been aware of the speech's misleading nature. The
t Mr. Johnson is a partner and Mr. Fisher is an associate at Davis Wright Tremaine LLP
in Seattle, Washington. They co-authored a brief of amici curiae in Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 123 S.
Ct. 2554 (2003) on behalf of forty leading newspapers, magazines, broadcasters, wire-services,
and media-related professional and trade associations. Much of this essay is drawn from that
brief, but none of the opinions discussed herein necessarily reflect the views of Davis Wright
Tremaine LLP or its clients.
I First Amended Complaint at 19, Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002) (No.
994446); see also id. at Exs. F-L (collecting some such articles).
2 Although some of the submissions to this symposium, see, e.g., Erwin Chemerinsky &
Catherine Fisk, What Is Commercial Speech? The Issue Not Decided in Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE
W. RES. L. REv. 1143 (2004), assume that Kasky alleged that Nike "lied" or made the false and
misleading statements at issue with actual malice-that is, knowing they were false or with
reckless disregard for whether they were false-Kasky did not so characterize his complaint in
the Supreme Court. See Nike, 123 S. Ct. at 2556-57 (Stevens, J., concurring) (noting that the
complaint would have to be amended if Kasky were going to advance any such claim). Accord-
ingly, the case was argued at the Supreme Court on the premise that Nike was at most negligent
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Supreme Court has explained that the First Amendment permits
commercial speech to be regulated more tightly than ordinary ex-
pression in order to "prevent[] commercial harms",3 and to "pro-
tect[] consumers."4 But these explications lie somewhere between
utterly circular and terrifically obtuse. And they tell us little about
whether the public statements that Kasky complained about-
Nike's allegedly deceptive public statements regarding its overseas
labor practices-were proper fodder for a consumer protection
lawsuit.
If the purpose of the commercial speech doctrine is to allow
the government to hold all for-profit companies and those compa-
nies' executives' to a higher standard of truthfulness in all of their
public communications on subjects that might influence consum-
ers, then Kasky might have had a legitimate grievance. If, how-
ever, the purpose of the doctrine is merely to allow the government
to ensure that consumers are accurately informed about products
and services in the marketplace, then the fact that the media al-
ready "expos[ed] Nike's actual practices" would seem to have
made Kasky's dependence on the commercial speech doctrine in-
appropriate. In Nike, Inc. v. Kasky,6 the Court refused to resolve
this quandary, dismissing the case as improvidently granted and
leaving in place (at least for now) the California Supreme Court's
ruling that the commercial speech doctrine broadly applies to
speech that a company makes essentially in any forum describing
its products, services, or business operations, regardless of
whether any actual deception results.7
This Article takes issue with California's new interpretation
of the commercial speech doctrine and contends that the commer-
cial speech doctrine does not allow the government to apply
stricter standards to any speech that a company makes in order to
bolster or sustain its bottom line. Such a governmental interest has
virtually no stopping point in a world in which companies have
in making the statements at issue.
3 City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, 507 U.S. 410,426 (1993).
4 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,460 (1978).
5 While some of the submissions to this Symposium question whether companies truly
have First Amendment rights on par with individual citizens' rights, see, e.g., C. Edwin Baker,
Paternalism, Politics, and Citizen Freedom: The Commercial Speech Quandry in Nike, 54
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1161, 1178-79, 1181; James Weinstein, Speech Categorization and the
Limits of First Amendment Formalism: Lessons from Nike v. Kasky, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1091, 1111-12, 1116 (2004), one need not dwell on that issue because Kasky named Phil Knight
and other Nike executives individually as defendants, and the California Supreme Court allowed
those claims to go forward.
6 123 S. Ct. 2554 (2003).
7 See Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 262 (Cal. 2002) (not deciding whether Nike's
speech was in fact false or misleading).
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fiduciary duties to generate profits, and it ultimately would subject
all business speech to second-class status. 8 Rather, a close inspec-
tion of the larger landscape of the Supreme Court's First Amend-
ment jurisprudence reveals that the true purpose of the commercial
speech doctrine is to allow the government to address a much more
narrow problem: the possibility that companies may impart false or
misleading information that consumers may act upon without hav-
ing time for reflection or counterspeech. Viewed thusly, the com-
mercial speech doctrine pertains only to a much more modest class
of business speech: that which occurs in direct proximity to con-
sumers' purchasing decisions, e.g., speech that proposes a com-
mercial transaction on a product label, advertisement, or similar
format. The doctrine does not pertain to speech offered in a public
debate regarding a company's corporate citizenship or otherwise at
least one step removed from actual purchasing decisions.
Part I of this Article describes Kasky's complaint and-
making explicit what was implicit in some of his own exhibits to
that filing-places the complaint in the context of the larger public
debate that surrounded Nike's statements. Part II explains why the
First Amendment should have required the dismissal of Kasky's
complaint-namely, because when speech is made, as Nike's was
here, to the media in the context of a public debate about contro-
versial business practices, it should fall outside the commercial
speech doctrine. Based on this understanding, Part III sets forth a
taxonomy of business speech and concludes that the dividing line
between commercial and noncommercial speech is not, as many
have argued, between statements regarding products and those in-
volving corporate "images," but rather is between statements made
in the course of economic transactions and those made in other
formats during public debates.
I. KASKY'S COMPLAINT AND THE PUBLIC DEBATE
OVER NIKE'S LABOR PRACTICES
The Kasky case grew out of a major public debate concerning
the labor practices in Southeast Asian countries, where many large
companies such as Nike produce their products. Beginning in
1995, several labor and environmental groups began publicly as-
serting that the working conditions in Nike's overseas factories
were dangerous, that workers were mistreated and underpaid, and
that child labor was being utilized. The assertions quickly gener-
8 For a warning from one of the Court's current Justices against putting too much empha-
sis on a speaker's economic motivation, see Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60,
81-83 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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ated a firestorm of media scrutiny and editorial coverage, render-
ing Nike a lightning rod for complaints regarding the perceived ills
of economic globalization. Groups began calling for legislative
action in the United States and abroad and boycotts of Nike's
products.9 In response to this mounting controversy, Nike de-
fended its business operations by issuing press releases, writing
letters to the editor and op-eds in newspapers around the country,
and sending a letter to university presidents.
Kasky complained about a handful of allegedly deceptive
statements that Nike had made in nine of these various documents,
primarily the press releases. The first statement was a response to
protests that Nike, as summarized in a column in The New York
Times, "benefit[s] both directly and indirectly from the systematic
oppression of the Indonesian people" and that "Nike execu-
tives ... are not bothered by the cries of the oppressed. It suits
them. Each cry is a signal that their investment is paying off."'
0
Nike countered in its press release that it treated its overseas work-
ers well and that the average line-workers' wage in Asian facilities
was "double the government-mandated minimum.""
Nike's release, however, did not generate any immediate press
reports. When the media eventually ran stories repeating Nike's
double-the-minimum-wage claim, they generally stated in the
same articles that the claim was potentially misleading. Business
Week, for instance, reported that "Nike Chief Executive Philip H.
Knight defends the Indonesian operations, saying that sneaker as-
semblers in Indonesia earn an average of double the minimum
wage. But that's because they have no choice but to do over-
time."' 12 The San Francisco Chronicle, the leading newspaper in
Kasky's hometown, further noted in an article printing Nike's
claim that developing countries "deliberately set [minimum wages]
below the subsistence level" and that a human rights group was
asserting that Nike pressured such countries into denying overtime
and keeping worker pay artificially low.13
Second, Kasky complained about Nike's statement in the
same press release that it provided "free meals" to its employees.
4
But when the San Francisco Chronicle investigated this claim, it
9 See Nike, 123 S. Ct. at 2566 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
10 Bob Herbert, Nike's Bad Neighborhood, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1996, at A29.
1 First Amended Complaint at 46, Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002) (No.
994446).
12 Elisabeth Malkin, Pangs of Conscience: Sweatshops Haunt U.S. Consumers, BUSINESS
WEEK, July 29, 1996, at 46.
13 Stephanie Salter, Decent Wages for Nike Workers? Just Do It, S.F. CHRON., June 27,
1996, at A19.
14 First Amended Complaint at 52, Kasky (No. 994446).
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reported that despite such promises, a factory in Indonesia "started
deducting 25 cents-a-day from workers' daily wages as a charge
for the cost of lunch."' 5 When a representative business periodical
repeated Nike's assertion, it also noted that other groups, "on the
other hand, are concerned about persistent reports of exploitative
conditions."
' 16
Coverage of Nike's two other allegedly misleading assertions
in press releases followed a similar pattern of point and counter-
point. Nike's representation that its "expatriates ensure safe work-
ing conditions and prevent illegal working conditions"' 7 was
quickly challenged in a nationally televised segment on CBS's
news magazine 48 Hours. The story recounted "a fair number of
incidents of physical abuse of workers" in violation of local regu-
lations at Nike's Asian factories and suggested that Nike exercised
very little control over supervisors of those factories.' 8 A Time
magazine article added that Nike had a "credibility problem" on
this issue because even if factory owners truly abide by "the Indo-
nesian government's labor standards[, that] is saying very little"
because those standards condone dubious practices such as child
labor. 
19
Nike's final contested press release, in which it asserted it
,,20guaranteed "a living wage for all workers, was issued about one
year later, in response to renewed allegations against the company.
In the fall of 1997, leading newspapers reported that a coalition of
women's groups was charging that Nike's Asian female employees
"often suffer from inadequate wages, corporal punishment, forced
overtime and/or sexual harassment.' (By this time, several Inter-
net sites also were collecting and posting negative press coverage
of Nike in order to combat, as one such website entitled "Boycott
Nike" put it, Nike's "progressive image., 22) After Nike issued its
responsive press release, a typical media story repeating Nike's
'5 Julia Angwin, The Tired Souls Behind Nike Soles: Indonesian Worker Tells of Suffer-
ing, S.F. CHRON., July 26, 1996, at B3.
16 Andy Zipser, Nike: Shareholders Will Be Sweating It Out, Too, BARRON'S, Sept. 16,
1996, at 11.
17 First Amended Complaint at 28, Kasky (No. 994446).
18 48 Hours: Just Doing It (CBS television broadcast, Oct. 17, 1996), at http:Ilwww.
saigon.com/-nike/48hrfmt.htm.
19 Nancy Gibbs, Cause Celeb: Two High-Profile Endorsers Are Props in a Worldwide
Debate over Sweatshops and the Use of Child Labor, TIME, June 17, 1996, at 30.
20 First Amended Complaint at 62, Kasky (No. 994446).
21 Steven Greenhouse, Nike Supports Women in Its Ads, but Not Its Factories, Groups
Say, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1997, at 30; see also Dottie Enrico, Women's Groups Pressure Nike
on Labor Practices, USA TODAY, Oct. 27, 1997, at B2 (citing a Dartmouth study that found that
the average annual wage for Vietnamese Nike workers was, in some cases, nearly $200 lower
than the average Vietnamese worker's wages).
22 Boycott Nike, http://www.saigon.com/-nike/nike.html (last visited Apr. 14, 2004).
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"living wage" claim also included an assertion from an interest
group that "Nike's workers in Vietnam could 'barely afford three
meals a day let alone transportation, rent, clothing, health care, and
much more.' 23 An ESPN television documentary that later aired
on the issue also directly challenged Nike's claim.
24
Nike's letters to the editor and editorial advertisements that
Kasky complained about also met with vigorous concurrent coun-
terspeech. Nike's letter to the editor of The New York Times, in
which it claimed that it provided employees "free meals, housing
and health care, 25 appeared amidst several scathing editorials in
that newspaper-as well as in one of Kasky's local papers-
26concerning Nike's overseas business practices. Nike's editorial
advertisement asserting that it was "doing a good job" and "operat-
ing morally ' 27 appeared during this same time period and on the
same day (June 24, 1997) as one of Mr. Herbert's columns. It was
followed later by another editorial in the San Francisco Chronicle
claiming that "Nike's hypocrisy knows no bounds. 28
In light of all of this contemporaneous and easily accessible
press coverage, it is difficult to understand how consumers could
have been misled by any alleged inaccuracies in Nike's speech.
Even Kasky himself scrupulously refused to allege that he had
been deceived in any way by Nike's assertions. At the very least,
any person who wished to factor Nike's labor practices into his or
her purchasing decisions would have been alerted that serious alle-
gations had been leveled against Nike and that Nike's credibility
was being questioned.
Nor is there anything unusual about this type of media cover-
age. In fact, it is exactly what one would expect regarding an issue
of intense public concern, and it places the First Amendment issue
in Kasky and in similar future controversies in stark relief: When
the media provide consumers with informative counterspeech re-
garding a company's business practices, and consumers have am-
ple time to reflect on that information, should the government nev-
23 Nike's Treatment of Women Overseas Assailed, Spokesman Defends Pay, DALLAS
MORNING NEWS, Nov. 2, 1997, at A44.
24 See First Amended Complaint at 64, Kasky (No. 994446) (describing Outside the
Lines: Made in Vietnam: The American Sneaker Controversy (ESPN television broadcast, Apr.
2 & 11, 1998)).
25 First Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 52, Kasky (No. 994446).
26 See Bob Herbert, From Sweatshops to Aerobics, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 1996, at A15;
Bob Herbert, Nike's Bad Neighborhood, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 1996, at A29; Bob Herbert,
Nike's Pyramid Scheme, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1996, at A17; Bob Herbert, Trampled Dreams,
July 12, 1996, at A27; Stephanie Salter, Decent Wages for Nike Workers? Just Do It, S.F. EX-
AMINER, June 27, 1996, at A19.
27 First Amended Complaint, supra note 2, at 58, Kasky (No. 994446).
28 Tim Keown, Hypocrisy Is Nike's Sole Purpose, S.F. CHRON., Nov. 14, 1997, at El.
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ertheless be allowed to punish companies for making potentially
misleading assertions to the press in the course of this coverage?
In other words, is there any "commercial harm" that flows from a
company's incorrect public statement about its business opera-
tions, even if any potentially misleading aspects of that statement
are counteracted before consumers make their ultimate purchasing
decisions?
II. PINNING DowN THE PURPOSE OF THE COMMERCIAL
SPEECH DOCTRINE
It is hombook law that "speech on public issues occupies the
'highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values,"' 29 and
that such speech may not be punished unless it is made, at a mini-
mum, with actual malice.3° In the famous words of Justice
Brandeis, the usual remedy to be applied to false speech on a mat-
ter of public concern "is more speech, not enforced silence.' Yet
the California Supreme Court's decision in Nike labels speech as
"commercial" even if it pertains to an ongoing public debate re-
garding a company's public image.32 To determine whether the
First Amendment allows consumer protection law to make such a
significant inroad into the public-concern rule, it is necessary to
identify the underpinnings of the commercial speech doctrine.
The text of the First Amendment does not distinguish between
commercial and noncommercial speech. This, of course, does not
necessarily mean that commercial speech cannot be more aggres-
sively scrutinized.33 To the contrary, the Supreme Court generally
has held that the Constitution often allows courts or the govern-
ment to apply enhanced scrutiny to particular practices when the
usual default suppositions surrounding those practices are not pre-
sent. For example, as John Hart Ely famously explained in De-
29 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) (citing NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware
Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982)).
30 See, e.g., id. at 145; N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964).
31 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring).
32 Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243, 254 (Cal. 2002).
33 Justice Thomas, as well as numerous commentators, generally has argued that commer-
cial speech ought to be treated the same as all other speech, at least when the speech at issue is
true and not misleading. See, e.g., 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 518-28
(1996) (Thomas, J., concurring); Alex Kozinksi & Stuart Banner, Who's Afraid of Commercial
Speech?, 76 VA. L. REv. 627 (1990). Whatever the merits of that view, the Supreme Court does
not appear interested in adopting this position in the near future. And even if it did, it is far
from clear that the Court also would treat misleading or false commercial speech the same as
other speech of public concern. Accordingly, we take it as a given, at least for now, that there is
some class of speech that may be properly characterized as "commercial" and afforded reduced
constitutional protection.
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mocracy and Distrust, the Court has varied the stringency of its
applications of the Equal Protection Clause according to how
likely it is that the political dynamics leading to the classification
at issue operated in a properly pluralistic manner.35 When there is
reason to suspect that the democratic process broke down, as in the
case of racial classifications, the Constitution permits increased
scrutiny.
The same reasoning applies to the First Amendment. To the
extent that there is sound justification for affording commercial
speech less constitutional protection than other speech about which
the public is keenly interested, that justification should be rooted
in a communicative breakdown that occurs in the commercial mar-
ketplace.
Perhaps the primary difference between communication in the
marketplace and other public interchanges of ideas that receive full
protection under the First Amendment is that assertions about
products and services that are made in the commercial marketplace
rarely afford consumers significant time or ability to scrutinize
their truthfulness. For example, when a company asserts that its
product contains a certain ingredient, that claim may not provide
any realistic opportunity for factual or ideological debate. 36  In-
deed, the Supreme Court has noted that in the context of profes-
sional services the public often "lacks sophistication" or access to
the information necessary to evaluate a solicitor's claim, even if it
tried to do SO.37 Given these realities, there is a very real danger
that, in Justice Stevens' words, consumers "may respond to [false
advertisements] before there is time for more speech and consid-
ered reflection to minimize the risks of being misled.,
38
A corollary of the Court's inability-to-reflect canon is that
false or misleading speech in the "commercial" context may be
regulated because it "lacks the value that sometimes inheres in
false or misleading political speech. 39  The usual rule is that
"[e]ven a false statement may be deemed to make a valuable con-
33 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 88-104 (1980).
36 See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 496 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring).
This concern that speech may spur people to harmful action before intervening information or
time for reflection is able to blunt the effect of the speech tracks another area of First Amend-
ment jurisprudence: the imminent lawless action doctrine. A person may not be punished for
advocating illegal activity if the addressees are likely to contemplate that advocacy or to receive
intervening speech before acting. See, e.g., Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
37 In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 200 (1982) (quoting Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 383
(1977)).
38 Rubin, 514 U.S. at 496 (Stevens, J., concurring).
39 Id.
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tribution to public debate, since it brings about 'the clearer percep-
tion and livelier impression of truth, produced by its collision with
error."' 40 But in the sphere of product advertising, the predomi-
nant goal is sales, not knowledge, and the time frame is short, not
long. Thus, the Court has held that the regulation of misleading
commercial speech prevents "uninformed acquiescence,' be-
cause, as Kathleen Sullivan has put it, "the consumer is not ex-
pected to have the competence or access to information needed to
question the advertiser's claim. '42 Even within the realm of com-
mercial speech, the Supreme Court has held that statements that
are "more conducive to reflection and the exercise of choice on the
part of the consumer" receive incrementally more First Amend-
43
ment protection.
In light of the First Amendment's emphasis upon relying
whenever possible on informed consumer choice, California's ex-
tension of the commercial speech doctrine beyond consumers'
ephemeral purchasing decisions makes little sense. Whatever
force the Court's inability-to-reflect rationale has when applied to
consumers' evaluation of direct proposals to engage in commercial
transactions evaporates in the context of public debates over good
corporate citizenship. In fact, by holding that consumers require
"protection" from potentially misleading information pertaining to
a company's social image during an ongoing public debate, the
California Supreme Court seemingly has reverted to the "paternal-
istic approach" to commercial speech regulation that the Court ex-
plicitly rejected in Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.44 It is paternalistic to assume that
consumers lack the ability to sift through competing assertions and
decide for themselves whether a company's attempts to enhance its
image reflects reality, or whether the cornany's statements should
influence their purchasing decision at all. 5 People perform essen-
tially the same exercise every day in assessing conflicting personal
and political speech; juries do it everyday in courtrooms across the
country.
40 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 n.19 (1964) (quoting JOHN STUART
MILL, ON LIBERTY 15 (Ronald B. McCallum ed., Oxford Press 1947) (1859)).
41 Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 774-75 (1993).
42 Kathleen M. Sullivan, Cheap Spirits, Cigarettes, and Free Speech: The Implications of
44 Liquormart, 1996 SuP. CT. REV. 123, 156 (1996).
43 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 642 (1985) (print advertise-
ments deserve more protection than personal solicitations); Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436
U.S. 447, 457-58 (1978) (same).
44 96 S. Ct. 1817 (1976); accord 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 496-
98 (1996) (plurality opinion); Id. at 520-23 (Thomas, J. concurring).
45 We are grateful to our DWT colleague, Eric Stahl, for contributing this point.
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It also is instructive to consider this issue from the business
community's perspective. While consumers have limited time to
assess product labels and print advertisements, companies have
virtually unlimited time to craft such traditional advertising
pitches. This is a dramatically different situation from responding
to media inquiries during a fast-developing public debate. If there
is a situation in which it is fair to hold a speaker accountable for
inadvertent or negligent misstatements, it is the former, not the
latter.
But even assuming that there is room after Virginia Pharmacy
to take the position that California currently does, the State's new
consumer protection scheme still improperly overruns the media's
role in our First Amendment hierarchy. The Supreme Court has
long recognized that the press is "a mighty catalyst in ... inform-
ing the citizenry of public events and occurrences. '" 46 This is be-
cause the media does more than simply provide an empty vessel
for third parties to disseminate their speech. 47 Rather, a core func-
tion of the press is to consider the sources of statements that it re-
ceives, as well as to investigate those statements' veracity and to
set them beside the counterspeech of other interested parties.
Thus, when a news organization receives a company's press re-
lease regarding its business operations, that organization can bring
independent judgment to bear on the accuracy of the release. If a
company's assertions are not credible, the media can, and some-
times does, decline to run any story on the subject. When media
entities publish controversial claims by businesses (either because
the claims are open to debate or because a publisher feels that the
subject of a report is entitled to present its side of the story), they
generally contrast those claims with independent analysis or oppo-
nents' counterclaims.48 Unlike the typical advertising scenario, in
short, potentially misleading corporate press releases in the course
of a public debate are automatically tempered by their clash with
competing speech.
Even when the media reprints a company's speech in an op-ed
or an editorial advertisement, that speech is very likely to be re-
sponsive to, or challenged by, other articles in the same publica-
tion. In contrast to advertisements that directly propose commer-
cial transactions, companies usually do not take the trouble to pur-
chase space in media publications to discuss their business opera-
4 Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965).
47 See, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 729 (1972) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
48 Cf. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 (1974) (stating that the press pro-
vides means of "counteract[ing] false statements" regarding public figures).
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tions unless those operations already have become the subject of
considerable public scrutiny. 49  Consequently, as with press re-
leases, the media typically arms the public with the resources for
full reflection on business practices discussed in op-eds and edito-
rial advertisements.
From a constitutional law standpoint, the media's provision of
these resources to would-be consumers makes all the difference.
For the press not only is effective in ventilating corporate speech
and in unmasking misleading claims regarding issues of public
concern, but it also is a constitutionally preferred means of doing
so. As the Supreme Court repeatedly has emphasized, "self-
government suffers when those in power suppress competing
views on public issues 'from diverse and antagonistic sources."' 50
Accordingly, "[tihe very purpose of the First Amendment is to
foreclose [the government] from assuming guardianship of the
public mind" through unnecessarily regulating the content of pub-
lic debate.5 1 Whenever the press presents the public with adequate
information to assess the accuracy of a speaker's claim, the Court
has insisted that "the people in our democracy are entrusted with
the responsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits of
conflicting arguments. 52
The California Supreme Court's Kasky decision pretermits
this entire process of ventilation and individual assessment. It
holds that the moment a company sends a press release or letter to
the media that offers a potentially misleading portrayal of the com-
pany's business operations, the company may be sued and held
strictly liable.53 It does not matter whether the media ever prints
the company's statements or, if they do, whether they place those
statements in context or beside assertions refuting them.
This holding impermissibly substitutes state regulation of the
content of public debate for the alternative suggested by the First
49 Compare James Gleick, Tangled Up in Spam, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 9, 2003, (Magazine) at
42 (complaining bitterly about floods of SPAM), with Microsoft Corp., Spiking the Spammers,
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2003, at A41 (editorial advertisement explaining industry anti-SPAM
efforts and urging consumer and government action). See also N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 266 (1964) (explaining that editorial advertisements are "an important outlet for the
promulgation of information and ideas" by non-publishers). Certainly that was the case with
Nike.
50 First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 777 n. 12 (1978) (quoting Associ-
ated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)).
51 Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 791 (1988) (quoting Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516, 545 (1945) (Jackson, J. concurring)).
52 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 791 (emphasis added). For a particularly robust description of the
deference due to the press in this regard, see generally Potter Stewart, "Or of the Press", 26
HASTINGS L.J. 631 (1975).
53 Kasky v. Nike, Inc., 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002).
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Amendment: media scrutiny and counterspeech. If, in the Kasky
case, consumers believed Nike's statements, it was not because
they lacked the ability to reflect on the ongoing controversy or be-
cause they lacked access to "more speech" challenging Nike's as-
sertions. 54 Nor was it because any party's false statements did not
"make a valuable contribution to public debate" by triggering addi-
tional investigation and corrective speech.55 In the classic mode of
public discourse on a controversial issue, the media ventilated
competing claims and provided the people with information that
allowed them to draw their own conclusions.
What is more, the California false advertising law, as con-
strued in Kasky, handicaps the business side of all public debates
regarding business issues by "licens[ing] one side of a debate to
fight freestyle, while requiring the other side to follow Marquis of
Queensberry rules. 56 Especially in these circumstances, the Su-
preme Court has held, "the First Amendment is plainly of-
fended. 57
III. A WORKABLE TAXONOMY OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH
While the inability-to-reflect rationale for punishing inadver-
tently false or misleading commercial speech may make sense in
the realm of product labels and advertisements, it lacks any force
whatsoever when the corporate speech at issue involves the com-
pany's business operations and is directed toward the media in the
context of an extended public debate on a matter of public con-
cern. Indeed, the very press coverage of Nike that forms the back-
drop of the Kasky case demonstrates that the media serves as an
effective watchdog over corporate press releases and more than
adequately counterbalances companies' assertions regarding con-
troversial business practices.
But to develop a workable definition of "commercial speech,"
we must recognize that Kasky is, in fact, essentially an easy case.
It involves neither speech in a traditional advertising forum nor
assertions about a particular product or service. When, as is in-
creasingly the case in our modern market economy, only one of
these attributes is absent, the question still arises whether the gov-
ernment should be permitted to subject a company's statements to
4 See Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 496 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring);
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 457-58 (1978).
55 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 n.19 (1964).
SR.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 392 (1992).
57 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 785-86.
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reduced First Amendment protection. A useful definition of com-
mercial speech must deal with each of these permutations.
It may be helpful to lay out a taxonomy to aid in this analysis.
The following matrix sets out four kinds of corporate speech ac-
cording to whether it is made in a traditional advertising forum;
whether it describes particular products or services that are for
sale, such as their physical attributes or the terms and conditions
on which they are available; whether it contains both of these at-
tributes; or whether it contains neither of them:
Speech involving Speech involving
products and business operations
services or "image"
Traditional Advertising 1 2
Format
Not Traditional 3 4
Advertising Format
Boxes 1 and 4 are the easy cases. Box 1 covers typical com-
mercial speech, such as product label or a newspaper advertise-
ment saying that Nike basketball shoes are on sale this weekend
for 20% off. Box 4 covers most, if not all, of the speech at issue in
Kasky,58 which, according to our analysis above, cannot properly
be characterized as commercial.
Boxes 2 and 3 are the hard cases. An example of speech cov-
ered by Box 2, taken from Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion
from the dismissal in Kasky, is a hypothetical tuna label sayinA
that the company employs "dolphin-safe" catching practices.
Other examples in modem society abound: oil companies advertise
their environmentally conscious methods of managing resources;
coffee companies sell "fair trade" coffee beans, which state on the
bag that the foreign workers were compensated in certain ways;
and express mail companies advertise on television and on labels
that they donate money to certain charities. In each of these in-
58 We hedge slightly here because of one unusual document in the case: a letter to univer-
sity presidents designed to assure them that Nike's overseas labor practices were lawful and
moral. Although Justice Breyer clearly viewed this as belonging in box 4, see Nike, 123 S. Ct.
at 2565-66 (Breyer., J. concurring), Justice Stevens-perhaps because the case was only at a
demurrer, or motion-to-dismiss, stage-opined that the letters could be viewed as "direct com-
munications with customers... that were intended to generate sales." Id. at 2558 (Stevens, J.,
concurring). That could place the letters in box 2.
60 Id. at 2566 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
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stances, the speech appears in a traditional advertising format, but
it concerns the company's business operations rather than the
product's physical attributes.
Box 3 covers the converse situation: speech that does not ap-
pear in a traditional advertising format but that pertains to particu-
lar products or services. For example, a company's president
might state on a television interview that his or her company's
computers process information faster than any competitor's. Or a
fast food company may issue a press release in response to a law-
suit filed that day stating that its products comprise part of a
healthy diet.
A proper understanding of the potential commercial harms
that animate the commercial speech doctrine dictates that the First
Amendment permits the government to regulate Box 2 as commer-
cial speech but not Box 3. The business speech in Box 2 is offered
in a context of a direct offer to engage in commerce and in which
consumers are actively making purchasing decisions. Here, con-
sumers may not have the time to gather potentially competing in-
formation. Nor are they likely to have resources to scrutinize the
companies' claims, since the speech is not being conveyed in the
context of a media story or similar format.
The speech in Box 3, however, is conveyed in the midst of
press coverage of an issue of public concern. Expanding the
commercial speech doctrine to deprive such speech of the usual
First Amendment protections is unnecessary because the media
coverage is likely to place any misleading statements into context
or to challenge any incorrect factual assertions. Even though the
company may inadvertently be imparting false information to (or
through) the media, consumers are likely to learn the truth (or
competing versions of the "truth") before acting on that informa-
tion. As Justice Breyer explained in his Kasky dissent, to the ex-
tent that the justification for stripping commercial communications
of "actual malice" protection conflicts with the justifications for
giving speech on matters of public concern the maximum possible
breathing space, "the last mentioned public-speech principle"
should trump the "first mentioned commercial-speech principle.,
61
This focus on the context of the communications diverges
from much of the critique of Kasky, which concentrates instead on
the subject of Nike's speech-viz., the fact that it involved busi-
ness operations instead of any tangible attributes of any of its
61 Id. at 2565 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 2559 (Stevens, J., concurring) (em-
phasizing the need for participants in an "ongoing discussion and debate about important public
issues" to be "free to participate.. . without fear of unfair reprisal").
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products. But this is as it should be. The Supreme Court does not
decide whether speech involves an issue of public concern depend-
ing on how important or topical the subject of the speech happens
to be. Rather, the First Amendment leaves it up to the public and
the media to decide what issues are worthy of public debate, and
then it protects parties' ability to speak on that issue. By the same
token, the commercial speech doctrine should leave it up to busi-
nesses and consumers to decide what issues are important enough
to appear on product labels and other direct advertisements. Those
issues may involve what the product is made of or how the people
who made the product were treated. Either way, once the market-
place dictates those advertising decisions, the government may
step in and regulate at the point of solicitation and sale.62 But
when the speech at issue is offered to the media or otherwise is
submitted during a public debate about a commercial matter, the
First Amendment assumes that the media and other channels of
communication already guard against consumers being misled, and
the First Amendment requires the government to stand down, ab-
sent at least a showing of actual malice.
In short, to borrow the Supreme Court's language, traditional
advertising or solicitation, regardless of whether it deals with spe-
cific products or more general business operations, is a "business
transaction in which speech is an essential but subordinate com-
,,63ponent. But a company's speech in a press release or an edito-
rial advertisement is a public statement in which business is an
essential but subordinate component. Because a company's public
statements are intended in significant part to participate in the
marketplace of ideas, as well as that of goods and services, the Su-
preme Court should refuse to allow the government to regulate
such speech with a strict-liability consumer-protection regime such
as California's. Such a regime improperly allows the government
to substitute censorship of public debates for the First Amend-
ment's preferred process of media investigation, counterspeech,
and consumer reflection.
62 This means that the government could pass a law allowing it to punish false or mislead-
ing speech and allowing private consumers to do the same so long as they relied on the speech
and were harmed by it. Private parties who were not gulled at the point of sale should not have
"standing" in the abstract to complain about allegedly false or misleading commercial speech.
The Supreme Court, in fact, already has adopted such a point-of-sale doctrine with regard to
derivative actions under SEC rule lOb-5, which arguably regulates commercial speech as well.
See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). This decision rested on
statutory grounds, but much of the reasoning makes sense with regard to claims that impact the
First Amendment more generally.
63 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,457 (1978) (emphasis added).
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